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 About the report 
This report is based on a background study and seminar on the functioning of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) organised under the auspices of European Climate Platform 
(ECP),
a which is a joint initiative by CLIPORE and CEPS. It contains an analysis of the CDM 
from strategic and operational perspectives, and addresses the question of how the CDM 
could be improved in order to transform it from a limited instrument to a major tool to 
achieve long-term climate change objectives. The Executive Summary contains key messages 
and a number of concrete and operational policy recommendations for CDM reform, to 
improve its immediate functioning and to fully exploit its future potential. The 
recommendations are addressed to the negotiating Parties of the United Nations Framework 
Convention of Climate Change gathering at the 11
th Conference of the Parties and 1
st Meeting 
of the Parties in Montreal in December 2005. Some of them may also be relevant to other key 
players influencing the functioning of the CDM, such as the CDM Executive Board (EB), the 
Designated National Authorities (DNAs), international organisations, non-governmental 
organisations or the corporate sector. The main report delves deeper into the key issues and 
gives the background of many of the policy recommendations. Approximately 30 climate 
stakeholders and experts participated in the seminar and were given the opportunity to review 
the report.
b Although the report attempts to reflect the views of all participants, responsibility 
for this report lies solely with the authors and the seminar Chairman, Bo Kjellen. 
Appendix I lists participants in the seminar. Appendix II contains a glossary of terms and 
abbreviations used in this report.  
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer: The key issues and recommendations in this report are based on an ECP seminar 
in which about 30 climate stakeholders and experts (listed in Appendix I) participated in their 
personal capacity. Drafts of the report have been discussed with the seminar participants. 
However, the responsibility for the content lies solely with the authors and the Chairman. 
 
 
                                                 
a For further information on the ECP, please see the back cover of this report or visit: 
http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=484. 
b Discussions in the seminar were based on two ECP Background Papers, which can be accessed at: 
http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=485. All seminar participants are listed in Appendix I of this 
report. Contents 
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IMPROVING THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
I.  Defining the Challenge 
The creation of the CDM – as well as the other Kyoto Protocol flexible mechanisms – is an 
unprecedented achievement. It has created an international market-based cooperation 
mechanism for sustainable development to the benefit of both industrialised and developing 
countries. However, learning-by-doing has demonstrated the difficulty of achieving the 
environmental and development aims envisioned for the CDM. Both environmental and 
development priorities require a rapid transition away from fossil-fuel-based economic 
development in developing countries. In addition, the scale of the climate challenge 
necessitates an efficient use of resources for reducing emissions in industrialised countries. 
From this perspective, clearly, the scale of the contribution that can be made by the CDM 
under current conditions is insufficient. 
Although small in its current form, over time the CDM could radically transform international 
economic and environmental cooperation, notably by using the power of markets to achieve 
economic efficiency in meeting Annex I emission targets while stimulating the deployment of 
renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies in developing countries. To harness this 
potential without sacrificing the environmental effectiveness of the mechanism requires a 
upgrading of the institutional capacity to manage and use the mechanism (in industrialised 
and developing countries). Moreover, in order to fulfil its tasks, the CDM must meet the 
fundamental challenge of linking together two hitherto separate international logics; that of 
global capital markets and that of international negotiations between sovereign nation states.  
 
II. Key  Messages 
Objectives 
1.  The CDM is designed according to its objectives as stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol 
(sustainable development and helping Annex I parties to reach their Kyoto target). 
However, it is often judged against other objectives or intentions, such as its potential to 
stimulate technology transfer, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or to lead to 
decarbonisation of (future) economic activities. This is not to say that these objectives are 
not valid and should not be pursued. However, the CDM – in its current form – should not 
be held hostage to unrealistic expectations.  
2.  In the long-term, it is essential to reconsider the objectives of the CDM if it should make 
a meaningful contribute to long-term climate change objectives. Most important will be 
whether the CDM in the post-2012 framework will become the principal tool for reducing 
GHG emissions in non-Annex I Parties or just one of the options available. If the CDM is 
to become a major tool, it will need to depart from a ‘project-by-project’ approach in 
order to achieve the necessary scale. At the same time, the CDM would also need to 
provide more incentives for technology transfer as ultimately the long-term climate 
change policy aspiration can only be met by large-scale deployment of clean 
technologies. 
 
Governance 
3.  The CDM is hampered by governance issues, notably the functioning of the CDM 
Executive Board (EB) and some of the Designated National Authorities (DNAs) of CDM 
host countries. The two have in common that they both need sufficient resources to ii | EGENHOFER, VAN SCHAIK & CORNLAND 
perform their tasks. The CDM Executive Board (EB) does not operate in a vacuum and 
must be judged in its role as part of the UNFCCC system. It is a body that had to explore 
new unprecedented ground and that notably operates in an incomplete and uncertain 
framework. 
 
Market functioning 
4.  The uncertainty about the future post-2012 regime has a major impact on market 
dynamics. Hence there is a need for clarification of as many points as possible as soon as 
possible. In addition, as national or regional carbon markets are emerging, the 
infrastructure for the trading market is far from complete. Principal missing parts are the 
International Transaction Log (ITL) and the infrastructure for emissions trading as set 
forth in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. These are the preconditions for the proper 
working of the CDM market.  
 
Project scope 
5.  As a market-based instrument, the CDM tends to favour projects where they are cheapest 
and most secure. This has put countries with weak economies and a lack of adequate 
institutional infrastructure in a disadvantageous position to benefit from the CDM, as 
reflected in the regional imbalances in the pool of projects currently under 
implementation. This limitation is a barrier to avoiding fossil-fuel-based development in 
countries in earlier stages of economic development and, further, undermines broad 
support for the CDM. In the short-term, measures such as lower fees could be introduced 
to improve the competitiveness of projects in such countries. A strategy for the long term, 
however, must attempt to eliminate these barriers. This will require additional, 
complementary, approaches (or policies). 
6.  There are good arguments in favour of an extension towards a broader range of forestry 
and bio-energy projects, such as avoided deforestation, land degradation and 
devegetation. Allowing the issuance of CERs (certified emissions reductions) for 
unilateral CDM projects and notably transforming the CDM into a more programmatic or 
sectoral mechanism, however, deserves further consideration, notably in the light of the 
envisaged objectives and scale the CDM should have post-2012.  
 
III. The Time Frame for CDM Reform 
The CDM has seen difficulties, often related to the challenges of bringing the logics of capital 
markets and the international negotiations together. Problematic areas can be grouped under 
four headings; objectives, governance, market functioning and project scope. This report has 
identified for each of these categories short, medium and long-term issues.  
•  Short-term issues in essence are related to governance of the CDM Executive Board 
and capacity-building in CDM host countries. Since the window of opportunity of 
launching projects aimed at reducing emissions within the Kyoto Protocol’s first 
compliance period essentially closes by the end of 2006, governance issues need to be 
addressed at COP11/MOP1 and immediately thereafter. 
•  Medium-term challenges relate to the phase between now and when agreement is 
reached on a post-2012 regime. The CDM will have to deal with a situation where 
projects that are initiated after 2006 face considerable uncertainty. The Parties should 
end this uncertainty by either reaching a pre-agreement on the format and scope of the 
CDM in a future regime or by securing the continuation of the CDM through 
domestic policies, such as for instance the EU Emissions Trading Scheme or its 
extension and potentially through other national or regional schemes.  IMPROVING THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM | iii 
 
•  The long-term (post-2012) would allow for a rethinking of the CDM in the light of 
long-term greenhouse gas abatement objectives and emission trends.  
 
IV. Recommendations 
Specific recommendations are included under each heading below. Where appropriate, the 
time-frame is indicated.  
 
Objectives 
1.  In the period until 2012, accelerated efforts should be put in place to clarify to project 
proponents how additionality and sustainable development are defined and assessed 
by the CDM Executive Board (EB) and the Designated National Authorities (DNAs), 
respectively. Some further improvements could be made to the additionality tool of 
the EB, in order to sharpen the focus on the additionality of emission reductions and 
not on the CDM project as such, for instance by deleting the provision on the impact 
of CDM registration. 
2.  The objectives and envisaged role and scale of the CDM in a post-2012 regime 
should be reconsidered before discussing its design. Issues include its role vis-à-vis 
technology transfer, FDI, ODA and other international treaties, protocols and 
agreements. 
3.  Parties should seriously consider setting technology transfer objectives at the outset 
when defining the role of the CDM in a future regime, for instance through the 
building-in of time-bound incentives for the use of environmentally-preferred 
technologies. 
4.  If a serious scaling-up of the CDM were envisaged in terms of emission sources, 
sectors and regions, Parties should consider broader approaches (such as 
programmatic or sectoral CDM). Preconditions for such a scaling-up are the political 
will of Annex I Parties to create sufficient demand for CERs and methods in non-
Annex I countries for harmonising the CDM with other policies. In such a case, more 
work must be done on CDM design and implementation.  
 
Governance 
5.  The design and operational structure of the CDM must integrate the logic of markets, 
meaning the integration of an understanding of business conduct, investment 
strategies and language. 
6.  Members of the CDM EB should be nominated and elected by their regional groups 
on the basis of a yet-to-be-designed Terms of Reference. Despite that, it can have 
advantages when Board Members are close to their DNAs, such as the benefit of 
having first-hand knowledge, to avoid the impression of conflicting interest one 
criterion should be the independence of EB members from DNAs. Moreover, the EB 
as such should exhibit a mix of expertise including financial, policy, regulatory, 
administrative, business or other, and include people with relevant management 
experience.  
7.  The EB/CDM Management Plan should set out ways on how to promote 
transparency, efficiency and consistency in the EB’s decision-making process and 
include a budget indicating the allocation of resources to specific tasks, staff and 
consultancy activities. In particular, the plan should include the respective roles of the 
EB Chair and Members, publication of minutes and other relevant information, the 
rules and functions of technical panels and working groups, and procedures for iv | EGENHOFER, VAN SCHAIK & CORNLAND 
involving market participants. After a proposal by the EB, there should be a 
consultation process with stakeholders before the Management Plan is adopted.  
8.  The EB should focus on governance, policy and supervisory functions. The EB 
Secretariat should be answerable to the EB rather than the UNFCCC Secretariat, and 
should support and implement the decisions of the EB. There should be more 
extensive use of delegation to panels and working groups.  
9.  The EB should establish a help desk for project developers and Designated 
Operational Entities (DOEs).  
10. To increase transparency, the EB should set-up an easily accessible compilation of all 
valid EB decisions.  
11. It is of crucial importance that the CDM truly becomes self-financing no later than 
2008 and that Parties ensure that sufficient resources are actually delivered to the 
EB’s accounts in the period until 2008. Therefore, Parties that have pledged financial 
contributions should pay up immediately. The COP/MOP should allocate a sufficient 
percentage of the share of the proceeds on the sale of CERs to the Executive Board. 
The 15 cents per CER for small-scale projects and 20 cents per large-scale projects 
that have recently been proposed should be considered the minimum.  
12. Until 2008, Annex-I Parties should not only pledge, but also actually deliver 
sufficient funding to keep a global institution with significant financial impact up and 
running.  
13. The capacity of DNAs needs strengthening. This could be achieved, for instance, 
through accelerated support from development agencies. DNAs play a vital role not 
only in promoting the CDM, but also in creating awareness of climate change and 
options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions at project level. Project developers can 
be encouraged by clear and timely responses to envisaged projects. 
 
Market functioning 
14. The necessary trading infrastructure consisting of the International Transaction Log 
and the International Emissions Trading needs to be put in place no later than 2008. 
15. As the post-2012 framework will have a major impact on market dynamics, 
international negotiators should strive to clarify as many of the design issues as 
possible.  
16. Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol should guarantee and enable the continuation 
of the activities of the CDM EB, in case the post-2012 regime remains uncertain after 
2008, and send a clear signal that credits will be recognised beyond 2012. 
 
Project scope 
17. Government tenders and carbon funds should address and attempt to rectify 
imbalances in project types, sectors and regions. Governments should also support 
efforts to develop new methodologies addressing emission sources that are currently 
underrepresented (e.g. Japanese Future CDM project).  
18. If a continuation of the CDM in its current form and scope is envisaged, Parties 
should reconsider the inclusion of a broader range of forestry and bio-energy projects, 
such as avoided deforestation, land degradation and devegetation.  
19. The COP/MOP should decide whether or not it envisages a serious scaling-up of the 
CDM. This would require additional work on technical issues related to design (i.e. 
the exploration of, for example, programmatic and sectoral approaches) and 
implementation.  | 1 
IMPROVING THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM  
MAIN REPORT 
1. Introduction 
The creation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
1 – as well as the other Kyoto 
Protocol flexible mechanisms – is an unprecedented achievement. It has created an 
international market-based cooperation mechanism for sustainable development to the benefit 
of both industrialised and developing countries. Although small in its current form, over time 
this mechanism could radically transform international economic and environmental 
cooperation, notably by using the power of markets to achieve economic and environmental 
goals.  
The CDM creates unprecedented challenges to the international community. It constitutes a 
first, albeit small step towards a global governance of a global environmental market. It is 
often overlooked that the CDM is breaking ground when it comes to designing a global 
institutional (and supervisory) framework for emerging global carbon markets. To date, 
environmental markets have been limited to national (e.g. US) or regional organisations such 
as the EU. The CDM and the Kyoto flexible mechanisms or the linking of national and 
regional emissions trading schemes will necessarily have to operate in a new environment.  
At the same time, the CDM falls somewhat between two different logics. On the one hand, 
there is the logic of how sovereign nation states negotiate or operate in international 
negotiations and finally decide by consensus. On the other hand, there is the logic of 
international financial or commodity markets that react to incentives and promises of return 
on capital. Should the CDM and other flexible mechanisms succeed in the end, there is a need 
to bring these two different logics together. In this respect, as a first step it is important to 
increase mutual understanding and integration of the needs, working methods and ways of 
communication of both logics in the implementation of the CDM.  
2.  Background of the CDM: Objectives and expectations 
One of the central features of the Kyoto Protocol has been the creation of the three flexible 
mechanisms, which together would form the backbone of the international emissions trading 
regime. Such a system was considered essential to achieve cost-effectiveness and ensure 
cooperation by the corporate sector. Since the Kyoto Protocol had set absolute caps, global 
emissions trading was an almost logical consequence, not only to reduce total compliance 
costs, but also to ensure equal marginal abatement costs across Parties. The CDM would be 
the principal tool for abatement options in the non-Annex I Parties or developing countries. 
The objectives of the CDM are i) to help Annex I Parties to meet their emissions targets and 
ii) to assist non-Annex I Parties in achieving sustainable development and in avoiding future 
emissions. It was hoped inter alia that the flexible mechanisms would trigger investment, 
speed-up technology transfer and ultimately help bring countries onto a lower carbon 
trajectory. These ideas were catalysed by modelling results presenting large volumes of 
potential CDM credits given the relatively low abatement costs estimated in non-Annex I 
Parties (e.g. Jansen, 2002 and Vrolijk, 2000). The Marrakech Accords, agreed at the COP in 
2001, reflect the intention of Parties to make the CDM a tool for attracting technologies to 
developing countries (Decision 17 CP 17/CP.7). 
                                                 
1 This report does not contain a general introduction to the CDM, which can be found for instance at 
http://www.unfccc.int/cdm or in “CDM and JI in charts” (http://www.iges.or.jp/en/cdm/report01.html). 
For the latest news on the CDM, we refer to various magazines, such as JIQ, JIKO info, CDM 
highlights and the CDM Investment Newsletter.  2 | EGENHOFER, VAN SCHAIK & CORNLAND 
 
The CDM was furthermore considered as a tool to engage various stakeholders, notably 
developing countries and business by involving them in the project of designing a global 
climate change regime and carbon markets. The objectives and expectations regarding 
potential benefits of the CDM are listed in Box 1.  
 
Box 1. CDM objectives and expectations regarding potential benefits 
CDM objectives (Kyoto Protocol, Art 12):  
•  Help Annex I Parties to meet their emissions targets  
•  Assist the non-Annex I Parties to achieve sustainable development and to contribute to the 
ultimate objective of the Convention  
 
Other intentions, expectations or anticipated benefits: 
•  Achieve real reductions of greenhouse gases in developing countries 
•  Extend low-cost abatement options (cost-effectiveness); both for Parties needing to fulfil their 
Kyoto commitment and for the legal entities covered by the EU emissions trading scheme 
•  Create one of the pillars of the international emissions trading market; a considerable pillar in 
terms of volumes 
•  Involve developing countries in climate change mitigation 
•  Increase awareness of climate change and of opportunities for the use of clean technologies 
•  Involve the private sector in the climate change regime 
•  Make new investments (e.g. in the energy sector) more environmentally friendly  
•  Stimulate the transfer of low and zero carbon technologies  
•  Attract FDI to developing countries 
3.  The CDM reality and why it is important to improve it 
As of mid-October, 23 CDM projects were registered and 302 were in the process of 
validation or in another stage of the CDM registration process. Taken together these projects 
aim to abate some 456 Mt CO2e by 2012 (Fenhann, 2005). Also in October, the first actual 
CERs were issued, for a project generating 17,800 CERs (certified emissions reductions) per 
year.
2 Overall, CDM traded volumes are currently expected to remain relatively small. It is 
even unsure whether the anticipated volume in financial terms of $1.1 billion per year can be 
reached before 2012 (Ellis et al., 2004)
3. Nevertheless, it has been estimated that $1 of CDM 
finance can leverage $5 of additional finance.  
The conditions foreseen by the architects of the flexible mechanisms are not in place, 
especially with regard to the participation of the US. It withdrawal has had a tremendous 
impact on confidence in, and the pace of development of the carbon market in general and 
CDM in particular. Today it seems that the supply of CERs will not come close to the 
potential demand (see the section on market functioning below), even without demand from 
the US. It has become clear that the original models mapping a much larger amount of CERs 
overlooked the importance of key factors in their projections, such as weak economies and 
institutional infrastructure in potential host countries, the consequences of the political 
uncertainty surrounding demand in the first compliance period and the continuation of the 
CDM in a future regime, and the transaction costs of CDM projects. 
Hence, the CDM in its current shape seems not be able to live up to the expectations it has 
raised in terms of its intentions, and anticipated benefits. A collapse of the CDM could reduce 
interest on the part of business to become engaged in climate change policy. It could 
furthermore undermine technology transfer and the deployment of clean technologies. More 
                                                 
2 Press release UNFCCC, “First emissions credits issued under the Kyoto Protocol”, 20 October 2005. 
3 In comparison, the main financial mechanism for the financing of environmental projects, the Global 
Environment Facility, has spent $1.8 billion in the period 1991-2004. IMPROVING THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM | 3 
 
practically, the absence of a functioning CDM will deprive Parties as well as entities under 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme of vital compliance options.  
More important, a collapse of the CDM could also jeopardise an emerging international 
emissions trading system. Without such a system, it is difficult to see how a post-2012 regime 
could be based on targets (whether absolute, sectoral, relative or no-loose), which is seen by 
many as the way forward (see Pallemaerts et al., 2005; PEW, 2005; and Warren & Drexhage, 
2005). These weaknesses, in turn, would raise questions about the suitability of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the UNFCCC structure as the key elements of international climate change 
policy.  
4.  A strategy to improve the CDM 
The following sections discuss identified problems in the categories of objectives, 
governance, market functioning and project scope and repeat the policy recommendations for 
each of these categories. The overview does not intend to be extensive, but rather to highlight 
the issues that surfaced in debate during the seminar. The analysis distinguishes between 
issues of a short, medium and the long-term timeframe. 
The short-term describes the period within which changes can still affect the CDM as a 
compliance tool for the first Kyoto Protocol commitment period. As the World Bank and 
International Emissions Trading Association have stressed, the window of opportunity for 
launching new projects to use for compliance reasons will essentially close by autumn 2006 
as a result of project development lead times (Lecocq & Capoor, 2005). Hence, short-term 
changes will essentially be linked to CoP11/MoP1 in Montreal. The medium-term 
perspective focuses on the transition of the CDM to the post-2012 period and essentially 
covers how to manage the CDM in a period of uncertainty where the overall shape of the 
future agreement is likely to be unknown. Projects that will be initiated as of 2007 will most 
likely only be concluded for the post-2012 period and hence, be subject to considerable 
uncertainty. The long-term (post-2012) allows for a complete rethinking of the CDM in the 
light of long-term greenhouse gas abatement objectives, development goals and emission 
trends. Here the role of the CDM vis-à-vis other policies seems to be one of the key questions. 
While the short-term agenda is the most urgent, the three (short, medium and long-term) 
perspectives relate to each in that decisions affecting the short-term may influence both the 
medium and long term. Perhaps most important is to keep the CDM alive in the medium-term 
through an early commitment regarding its continuation post-2012 in order to reduce current 
uncertainty and safeguard the mechanism for the future. Hence, a critical element of any 
CDM strategy is to ensure consistency between the short, medium and long term.  
4.1 Objectives 
With regard to the CDM’s objectives, the most important issues that have been addressed in 
literature on the CDM have been the definition of contributions to sustainable development 
(e.g. Cosbey et al., 2005) as well as the capability of the CDM to stimulate technology 
transfer (Millock, 2002; Kartha et al., 2005). In a longer-term perspective, i.e. post-2012, 
there are a number of fundamental questions, such as what role the CDM could play as a 
driver for FDI (see Saner, 2005) or its interface with ODA. There are also questions on how 
the CDM relates to other international treaties, protocols and agreements.  
With regard to additionality, the debate has focused on how this concept has been defined and 
operationalised. According to project developers, the Executive Board (EB) of the CDM has 
focused too much on whether the project as such is additional (intent of the project) than on 
whether its emissions reductions are additional (IETA, 2005b). It might very well be the case, 
however, that with the approval of more (consolidated) methodologies, additionality may 
disappear as an issue far more quickly than expected, since it will become more transparent 
for project developers which types of projects would qualify and for what reasons. Current 4 | EGENHOFER, VAN SCHAIK & CORNLAND 
 
problems relate to technical issues such as how to better explain the terminology used. There 
might also be some scope for improving the additionality tool of the CDM Executive Board, 
for instance by removing the provision on the impact of CDM registration (IETA, 2005b). It 
should be noted, however, that it is not obligatory to use this tool. Nor is it obligatory to 
demonstrate the financial additionality of projects, which some allege would be difficult to 
demonstrate.  
The EB has no mandate to assess whether or not a project contributes to sustainable 
development. The Marrakech Accord leaves the definition of sustainable development to host 
countries. This has inevitably lead to a situation where different countries have defined it 
differently, which according to project developers can add to uncertainty (Cosbey et al., 
2005). Furthermore the projects allowed by host countries so far have raised questions among 
NGOs and other observers regarding their tangible contribution to sustainable development 
(Muller, 2005).
4 While this might be an area for further improvement and harmonisation 
between countries, progress is likely to be small as it would require additional host-country 
experience as well as capacity-building.  
A somewhat longer-term issue is to provide incentives for both the application of clean 
technologies and technology transfer. Ultimately, this issue needs to be settled, given that 
long-term climate change policy aspirations can only be met by the development and 
deployment of advanced technologies. Given the limited volumes of the CDM as well as the 
modest aspiration of the Kyoto Protocol targets, the role of the CDM for technology transfer 
currently is negligible. This means that other additional ways of transferring technologies may 
need to be devised or strengthened for the period until 2012. In addition, extra and time-
bound incentives for the use of environmentally preferred technologies could be taken into 
consideration. For example, the EB could reduce fees for project registration and/or host 
countries could create tax incentives and disincentives that promote a focus on prioritised 
project and technology types.
5 It should be kept in mind that technology transfer is a complex 
and multi-faceted issue that in itself will need further understanding.  
For the long-term it is essential to reconsider the objectives and the scope of the CDM. It is 
necessary to clarify whether the objectives of the CDM as stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol 
should be extended to explicitly include technology transfer and/or other objectives. It is 
important to discuss the goals that are to be achieved through the mechanism (in terms of 
volume, gases and geographical coverage) and then to redesign it accordingly. It is moreover 
important to determine whether the CDM is to be one of the options available or the principal 
tool for avoiding greenhouse gas emissions in non-Annex I countries.  
Scaling-up the CDM in order to achieve larger reductions of GHG emissions implies a 
willingness to create sufficient demand for CERs and to go beyond a ‘project-by-project’ 
approach in order to create sufficient supply (for example by means of a sectoral approach). A 
broader approach to the CDM could enable it to create more significant opportunities for 
attracting FDI to developing countries and could also lead to a larger degree of technology 
transfer. It can be expected that buyer countries in order to create sufficient demand will 
increasingly argue in favour of using ODA in order to reinforce CDM capacity-building 
efforts or projects with high sustainable development benefits. An important question is how 
the CDM in such a scenario would relate to incentives in fast-growing developing countries to 
start implementing not-CDM related abatement measures. 
Recommendations: 
•  In the period until 2012, accelerated efforts should be put in place to clarify to project 
proponents how additionality and sustainable development are defined and assessed by 
                                                 
4 To address these concerns a set of ‘higher standards’ for CDM projects has been established under the 
so-called ‘Gold Standard’. Application of the gold standard is voluntary (see for further information: 
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/). 
5 For example, China has decided to install a tax on f-gases projects (HFCs). See also Muller (2005). IMPROVING THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM | 5 
 
the CDM Executive Board (EB) and the Designated National Authorities (DNAs), 
respectively. Some further improvements could be made to the additionality tool of the 
EB, in order to sharpen the focus on the additionality of emission reductions and not on 
the CDM project as such, for instance by deleting the provision on the impact of CDM 
registration. 
•  The objectives and envisaged role and scale of the CDM in a post-2012 regime should be 
reconsidered before discussing its design. Issues include its role vis-à-vis technology 
transfer, FDI, ODA and other international treaties, protocols and agreements. 
•  Parties should seriously consider setting technology transfer objectives at the outset when 
defining the role of the CDM in a future regime, for instance through the building-in of 
time-bound incentives for the use of environmentally-preferred technologies. 
•  If a serious scaling-up of the CDM were envisaged in terms of emission sources, sectors 
and regions, Parties should consider broader approaches (such as programmatic or 
sectoral CDM). Preconditions for such a scaling-up are the political will of Annex I 
Parties to create sufficient demand for CERs and methods in non-Annex I countries for 
harmonising the CDM with other policies. In such a case, more work must be done on 
CDM design and implementation.  
4.2 Governance 
The debate on governance of the CDM has notably focused on the functioning of the EB but 
also on the capacity of DNAs in CDM host countries.  
The CDM EB does not operate in a vacuum but is faced with a number of strategic problems. 
The first is the UN’s role in creating an international market and how to ensure its credibility. 
Another important issue concerns the limitations that the lack of a post-2012 framework 
necessarily imposes with regard to certainty and stability of markets. Finally, the EB has a 
mandate from the COP, which sets a number of tasks. The basic task of the EB under the 
Kyoto Protocol is to ‘supervise projects’ as to whether they provide ‘real’ and ‘measurable’ 
reductions that are ‘additional’. Initially, as there has been no comparable institution with a 
similar role, its task was based on a bottom-up approach, i.e. building up ‘case law’. Over 
time, it is expected to switch over to a more top-down approach – for instance regarding 
project types where new methodologies might be needed or regarding how project proponents 
can increase the chance for approval of their projects. 
The principal question has been the efficiency of the EB,
6 with main issues being 
management and funding. There are concerns that the EB will not be able to cope with 400 
expected projects, including 80 methodology proposals that are currently being evaluated by 
the Methodology Panel.  
As to management, the principal criticism has been that there has been too much focus on 
day-to-day management. There is a sense that the EB attempts to undertake all the work itself 
(i.e. micro-management rather than management by exception with too little delegation). It 
should focus on strategic issues and strive to delegate as much as possible to staff and 
subordinate panels. Second, there are concerns regarding the work of the EB having become 
politicised due to perceived conflicts of interest of EB members. This concern relates 
particularly to EB members that have retained roles as ‘negotiators’, especially those involved 
in or related to national DNAs. A third criticism is the lack of consultation with stakeholders, 
notably with project participants. Fourth, persons acting as secretariat of the EB are employed 
by the UNFCCC Secretariat and therefore answerable to their superiors in this organisation. 
Hence, the EB ‘secretariat’ in the strict sense does not serve the EB but rather, the UNFCCC 
Secretariat, creating unclear responsibilities.  
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It has been acknowledged that many problems are related to a lack of funding. As a 
consequence there have been too few staff, resulting in too little communication within the 
EB and with the outside world, and in EB members performing multiple roles. Many 
problems are moreover related to an insufficient ability by the EB to grasp (or emphasise 
with) the logic of markets.  
The CDM is intended to become a self-financing body. The EB has recently proposed that 
revenue from issued CERs (‘share of proceeds to cover administrative expenses’) would be in 
cash. More concretely it has proposed that this fee be set at $0.20/CER for large and $0.15 for 
small-scale projects (including registration fee). The EB’s proposal will be discussed at the 
COP/MOP, which ultimately decides on the fee (JIQ, 2005). It is generally acknowledged that 
the fee should not impose a substantially large additional transaction cost to projects, making 
it even more difficult to develop them. It should however also ensure that the EB is to become 
financially independent as soon as possible, given the current experiences with insufficient 
resources actually being delivered to the EB.  
Another aspect influencing the governance of the CDM is the functioning of the DNAs 
(designated national authorities), especially those in CDM host countries. Project developers 
can be encouraged by a clear and timely response to envisaged projects. DNAs play a vital 
role not only in promoting the CDM, but also in creating awareness on climate change and 
options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions at project level. Not all Parties have set-up a 
DNA yet, which excludes them from participation in the CDM. The majority of already-
existing DNAs and especially those of CDM host countries would moreover suffer from a 
lack of resources and technological know-how which has led to considerable delays in project 
approval.  
Recommendations: 
•  The design and operational structure of the CDM must integrate the logic of markets, 
meaning the integration of an understanding of business conduct, investment strategies 
and language. 
•  Members of the CDM EB should be nominated and elected by their regional groups on 
the basis of a yet-to-be-designed Terms of Reference. Despite that, it can have advantages 
when Board Members are close to their DNAs, such as the benefit of having first-hand 
knowledge, to avoid the impression of conflicting interest one criterion should be the 
independence of EB members from DNAs. Moreover, the EB as such should exhibit a 
mix of expertise including financial, policy, regulatory, administrative, business or other, 
and include people with relevant management experience.  
•  The EB/CDM Management Plan should set out ways on how to promote transparency, 
efficiency and consistency in the EB’s decision-making process and include a budget 
indicating the allocation of resources to specific tasks, staff and consultancy activities. In 
particular, the plan should include the respective roles of the EB Chair and Members, 
publication of minutes and other relevant information, the rules and functions of technical 
panels and working groups, and procedures for involving market participants. After a 
proposal by the EB, there should be a consultation process with stakeholders before the 
Management Plan is adopted.  
•  The EB should focus on governance, policy and supervisory functions. The EB 
Secretariat should be answerable to the EB rather than the UNFCCC Secretariat, and 
should support and implement the decisions of the EB. There should be more extensive 
use of delegation to panels and working groups.  
•  The EB should establish a help desk for project developers and Designated Operational 
Entities (DOEs).  
•  To increase transparency, the EB should set-up an easily accessible compilation of all 
valid EB decisions.  IMPROVING THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM | 7 
 
•  It is of crucial importance that the CDM truly becomes self-financing no later than 2008 
and that Parties ensure that sufficient resources are actually delivered to the EB’s 
accounts in the period until 2008. Therefore, Parties that have pledged financial 
contributions should pay up immediately. The COP/MOP should allocate a sufficient 
percentage of the share of the proceeds on the sale of CERs to the Executive Board. The 
15 cents per CER for small-scale projects and 20 cents per large-scale projects that have 
recently been proposed should be considered the minimum.  
•  Until 2008, Annex-I Parties should not only pledge, but also actually deliver sufficient 
funding to keep a global institution with significant financial impact up and running.  
•  The capacity of DNAs needs strengthening. This could be achieved, for instance, through 
accelerated support from development agencies. DNAs play a vital role not only in 
promoting the CDM, but also in creating awareness of climate change and options for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions at project level. Project developers can be encouraged 
by clear and timely responses to envisaged projects. 
4.3 Market  functioning 
Although the market for CERs and other emissions credits is still very young, there are 
serious concerns that demand for CDM credits may outstrip supply. Haites (2004) has 
estimated the total Annex I demand for CERs to be between 217 and 640 Mt CO2e per year 
by 2010, out of a total demand for total credits of 869-1,098 Mt CO2e. In comparison, it has 
been estimated by Ellis & Levina (2005) that on the basis of current data (on current projects, 
registered, proposed and in the pipeline) a total supply of 178 Mt CO2e per year until 2008 
and 100 Mt CO2e per year between 2008-12 can be expected. EU member states alone have 
already indicated a demand of about 140 Mt CO2e (both CDM & JI) per year in their National 
Allocation Plans of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.
7 This does not yet cover potential 
demand by the sectors covered in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) that can use 
CERs (and ERUs) for compliance.
8  
Other pointers that the market is not functioning well are the price gap between EU 
Allowances and the CERs and the fact that more than half of the market participants in the 
CDM market are governments or international organisations (Saner, 2005). The price 
differential between the EU Allowances obtained under the EU ETS and CERs is surprising 
since the EU’s Linking Directive has established a link between the two markets.
9 One 
possible explanation for the difference is the registration and delivery risk of CERs, especially 
during the first phase of the EU ETS from 2005 to 2007 (Lecocq & Capoor, 2005). Another 
explanation is that not all EU member states have implemented the Linking Directive in 
national laws. Only when this has occurred will the sectors covered in these countries be able 
to use CERs for compliance with the EU ETS.  
Another important reason why the markets are not yet fully functioning is the missing market 
infrastructure. This includes first of all the absence of the International Transaction Log (ITL) 
but also the eligibility requirements Parties have to fulfil in order to engage in IET as outlined 
under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol and relevant articles in the Marrakech Accords. Only 
with large efforts can these infrastructures be expected to be in place as of mid-2007.  
                                                 
7 Figure provided by CANEurope (see Van Schaik & Egenhofer, 2005). 
8 CERs from nuclear projects and sinks are excluded. For large hydro projects, relevant international 
criteria and guidelines, including those contained in the report of the World Commission on Dams 
November 2000, “Dams and Development – A New Framework for Decision-Making”, are to be 
respected. 
9 Although EU allowances have consistently stood at above €20 for more than half a year, between 
January 2004 and April 2005, CERs traded between $3 and $7.15/ t CO2e with a weighted average of 
$5.63/ tCO2e (Lecocq & Capoor, 2005). The price of yet-to-be generated credits – whereby the risk is 
with the buyer – is even lower with an average of $4.23. 8 | EGENHOFER, VAN SCHAIK & CORNLAND 
 
Possibly the most important ‘missing link’ is the lack of certainty about the CDM’s role in the 
post-2012 period. While some argue that Parties already at COP11/MOP1 should agree on the 
continuation of the CDM, this would constitute a major prejudgement of the future regime. 
And even if the Kyoto Protocol partners were firm on continuity of the current regime, this 
would provide no absolute guarantee to the continuation of the CDM. Given the necessity of 
leaving these options open in the negotiating process, it is important to find a way to ensure – 
at a minimum – that credits generated after 2012 by projects being registered today will be 
recognised. Other ways for Parties to demonstrate their commitment to a continuation of the 
CDM post-2012 are to launch new CDM tenders and/or to set up or continue with domestic 
emissions trading schemes in which CERs are eligible credits. The EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme is expected to continue its operation irrespective of whether a global post-2012 
regime is achieved or not. In its current form, the caps set within this scheme are related to the 
GHG reduction commitments of the EU member states under the Kyoto Protocol, but the EU 
could decide to set longer-term targets irrespective of its international post-2012 commitment. 
Such circumstances, however, would almost certainly mean that it would be the EU ETS that 
determines market dynamics on the CDM market. 
Recommendations: 
•  The necessary trading infrastructure consisting of the International Transaction Log and 
the International Emissions Trading needs to be put in place no later than 2008. 
•  As the post-2012 framework will have a major impact on market dynamics, international 
negotiators should strive to clarify as many of the design issues as possible.  
•  Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol should guarantee and enable the continuation of the 
activities of the CDM EB, in case the post-2012 regime remains uncertain after 2008, and 
send a clear signal that credits will be recognised beyond 2012. 
4.4 Project  scope 
In the current pool of projects, most of the CERs are to be obtained from HFC23 destruction, 
followed by methane and N2O capture from animal waste (Lecocq & Capoor, 2005). There 
are relatively few CERs from energy efficiency projects. India has been the most successful 
host country in generating CDM activities. It has been difficult to generate projects in many 
of the least developing countries.  
The imbalance of project types should come as no surprise. A market-based system will 
always tend to favour projects where reductions are cheapest and most secure. Rather than 
being a sign of imperfection, the fact that the volume of the CDM follows market 
opportunities is inherent in the design. Imbalances in project types are not a failure but, rather, 
a result of this market-based approach. Markets exploit the possibility of arbitrage, hence 
different cost potentials.  
The focus on limited project types or gases, however, reduces the environmental effectiveness 
of the CDM as many reduction opportunities that might exist are not attractive under the 
current CDM framework, but of crucial importance for avoiding future emissions. Moreover, 
since only projects for which (consolidated) methodologies have been approved are eligible, it 
is important to have methodologies covering as many types of projects as possible available 
and to ensure rapid development of new methodologies when new technologies for reducing 
emissions emerge. Currently the project proponents carry the burden of developing 
methodologies. The Japanese Future CDM project
10 is a good example where the 
development of methodologies is funded publicly so as to ease the burden for private sector 
project developers and to extend the range of project types for which methodologies are 
available. 
                                                 
10  http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/global_environment/kyomecha/050531FutureCDM/ 
FutureCDM_main.htm. IMPROVING THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM | 9 
 
The reasons for regional imbalances are somewhat similar to imbalances in project types. In 
themselves, such imbalances are to be expected. One would expect projects in countries 
where historical and projected emissions are high. The yardstick against which geographical 
distribution will have to be judged is whether the portfolio of projects reflects historical and 
projected emissions of countries or regions. This is currently under examination by the 
OECD. 
Differences between countries however are also related to the – for CDM – relevant 
investment climate in the countries were projects can be undertaken (Niederberger & Saner, 
2005). Countries with weak economies and a lack of insufficient institutional infrastructure 
are in a disadvantageous position to benefit from the CDM. This limitation is a barrier to 
avoiding fossil-fuel-based development in countries in earlier stages of economic 
development and, furthermore, undermines support for the CDM and the international climate 
change regime from those countries that are largely excluded. Success of the post-2012 
framework is most likely to depend on the capacity of the international community to move 
forward jointly. To ensure broad political support for a future climate change regime, broad 
geographical balance of CDM projects will be needed.  
To reduce the imbalances, complementary actions may be needed such as blending different 
finance instruments – such as ODA and financing from international finance institutions – 
with carbon finance. Another option would be to build in time-bound incentives in the form of 
reduced registration fees and share of proceeds for certain types of projects or host countries. 
In the long term, as emission reduction targets are expected to become more stringent and to 
cover more countries, demand may increase, leading to hitherto ‘uneconomic’ CDM projects 
becoming more profitable. Nevertheless, the CDM as market-based instrument will never be a 
guarantee for balanced distribution. Therefore, structurally complementary tools to address 
imbalances may also be needed, such as reduced fees or tax incentives for certain types of 
projects with a large potential in regions where few CDM projects are currently carried out.  
Small-scale CDM projects (< 50,000 tCO2e reduction
11) are subject to favourable conditions 
compared to regular CDM projects. There is a simplified project cycle for small-scale projects 
and their registration fee is lower. Nevertheless it appears difficult to get these projects going.  
There are arguments in favour of an extension of the CDM towards a larger range of forestry 
and bio-energy projects, such as avoided deforestation, land degradation and devegetation.
12 It 
seems furthermore relevant to include biomass projects into the CDM, even if emissions from 
fossil fuels are not part of the baseline. For example this would make it easier to combine 
afforestation/reforestation with the use of biomass as a single project to submit to the CDM 
Executive Board.  
Unilateral CDM projects are carried out without an established Annex-I investor. The CDM 
Executive Board allows these projects to become registered, but credits cannot be issued 
without a buyer in place. The advantage of enabling unilateral generation of CERs is that 
doing so would allow freer market development by reducing buyer control of project 
development. In practice, projects that are unilaterally developed and registered have already 
been seen to reduce buyer risk, thereby increasing sales prices. Such projects may also have 
lower transaction costs as a consequence of higher degrees of human capital, institutional and 
infrastructure capacity and domestic capital available for project developers based in the host 
countries (Jahn et al., 2004). They could also stimulate increased supply of projects, 
ultimately strengthening the role of CERs in the market vis-à-vis ERUs and AAUs. On the 
                                                 
11 Small-scale CDM projects are either renewable energy projects with an installed capacity below 15 
MW, energy efficiency projects achieving energy savings up to 15 GWh p.a. or other project types not 
exceeding an annual emissions reduction of 15,000 tonnes. 
12 See for instance the contributions on: http://www.fao.org/sd/dim_en2/en2_050601a1_en.htm and 
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other hand, unilateral CDM by definition does not involve FDI and therefore the degree of 
technology transfer in the projects is likely to be lower.  
In the debate on a post-2012 regime various authors have proposed to move away from the 
project-based approach to the CDM towards a broader approach, such as a programmatic, 
policy-based or sectoral mechanism
13 for avoiding emissions in non-Annex-I countries. A 
paper by the Wuppertal Institute synthesises the debate on sectoral CDM and highlights a 
countervailing interpretation particularly with regard to the public vs. private sector character 
of a sectoral CDM (Sterk & Wittneben, 2005). They conclude that positive aspects of sectoral 
CDM include lower transaction costs and the establishment of the necessary infrastructure for 
GHG data collection in the covered sectors. Questions arise when considering how a sectoral 
CDM should be organised and whether or not demand would be sufficient to absorb the 
greatly increased numbers of CERs that would presumably become available when going 
beyond a project-based approach. It is therefore necessary to consider the approach to the 
CDM in the overall context of the objectives and scope the CDM is intended to fulfil in a 
future international agreement.  
Recommendations: 
•  Government tenders and carbon funds should address and attempt to rectify imbalances in 
project types, sectors and regions. Governments should also support efforts to develop 
new methodologies addressing emission sources that are currently underrepresented (e.g. 
Japanese Future CDM project).  
•  If a continuation of the CDM in its current form and scope is envisaged, Parties should 
reconsider the inclusion of a broader range of forestry and bio-energy projects, such as 
avoided deforestation, land degradation and devegetation.  
•  The COP/MOP should decide whether or not it envisages a serious scaling-up of the 
CDM. This would require additional work on technical issues related to design (i.e. the 
exploration of, for example, programmatic and sectoral approaches) and implementation.  
5. Conclusions 
The CDM is an important element of the current Kyoto Protocol structure, with significant 
potential for the future. It is an instrument with the potential to contribute significantly to 
efficiently achieving the emissions reductions and avoidance that are required, which would 
accomplish the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC. Most likely, the CDM – and all other 
tools of the current framework – may look different in the future. However, there is no time to 
wait. If the CDM is to survive as a potential contributor to a post-2012 regime, it is important 
to avoid its collapse in the near term. We would like to emphasise once more that a collapse 
of the CDM under the first compliance period could jeopardise further efforts to implement 
the Kyoto Protocol as well as the option of basing a post-2012 regime on absolute caps. This, 
in turn, could call into question the suitability of the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC 
structure as the key elements of international climate change policy.  
To avoid collapse it is necessary to bring about immediate changes related to governance, 
market functioning and project scope, along the lines of the recommendations put forward in 
this report. These are the first steps in building a CDM bridge to the future. Modifications 
made in the short-term are best done in the context of a strategic perspective with clearly 
defined objectives. It is critical that such changes be significant enough to create continuity, 
the perception of continuity and to restore confidence in the UNFCCC’s ability to implement 
the mechanism. This will be particularly challenging in light of developments in the 
negotiations over the medium-term, in which we can only expect a post-2012 regime to 
emerge slowly. 
                                                 
13 For further information on the sector-based approach as such, see Helme (2005). For information on 
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reduced below those that would have occurred in the absence of the 
registered CDM activity. 
Annex 1  Annex 1 of the UNFCCC refers to industrialised countries 
(including many economies in transition) 
CCAP  Center for Clean Air Policy (see: http://www.ccap.org) 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism: Art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol 
establishes that Annex I Parties (and firms in these countries) can 
transfer certified emissions reductions (CERs) from projects in 
developing countries 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies, a Brussels-based think-tank 
established in 1983 (see: http://www.ceps.be) 
CER  Certified emission reductions; credits that can be obtained through 
CDM projects 
CLIPORE  Climate Policy Research Programme of the Swedish Foundation for 
Strategic Environmental Research, Mistra (see: 
http://www.clipore.org) 
COP  Conference of the Parties, comprising representatives of 
governments that are Party to the UNFCCC. The COP is the 
supreme decision-making body in the UNFCCC negotiations  
CO2  Carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas (GHG) covered in the 
Kyoto Protocol 
CH4   Methane, one of the six GHGs covered in the Kyoto Protocol 
DNA  Designated National Authority; the entity in each Party responsible 
for the CDM (see: http://cdm.unfccc.int/DNA). 
DOE    Designated Operational Entity; an organisation designated by the 
COP/MOP, based on a recommendation of the EB, that is qualified 
to validate proposed CDM project activities as well as verify and 
certify GHG emission reductions.  
EB  Executive Board of the CDM; entity responsible for governing the 
CDM under the auspices of the MOP (see: http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB) 
EC  European Communities, referring to the economic competencies of 
the European Union 
ECP  European Climate Platform, initiative by CLIPORE and CEPS to 
improve the interaction between climate policy research and policy-
making (see: http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=484) 
ERU  Emission Reduction Units, credits that can be obtained through 
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ET  Emissions Trading: generic term for trade of emissions rights (see 
also EU ETS, IET, International Emissions Trading) 
EU  European Union (see also EC) 
EU ETS  EU Emissions Trading Scheme, covering CO2 emissions from 
industry and the power sector 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
Flexible Mechanisms  Those market-based mechanisms established by the Kyoto Protocol 
that allow the transfer or exchange of emissions reductions 
obligations between Parties. Sometimes also referred to as the 
Kyoto Mechanisms or Mechanisms (see also CDM, JI, ET) 
GHG 
 
Greenhouse gas, usually referring to one of the six gases covered by 
the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) 
and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
G-8  Regular summit of the heads of the eight most important economies 
GtC  Gigatonne of carbon (1 Gt = 1,000 Mt) 
GtCO2  Gigatonne of carbon dioxide 
Host Party  A Party not included in Annex I of the UNFCCC on whose territory 
the project activity is physically located. 
IEA International  Energy  Agency 
IET International  Emissions  Trading, as established under Article 17 of 
the Kyoto Protocol, allowing Annex B Parties to trade Assigned 
Amount Units (the GHG emission units of the Kyoto Protocol)  
ITL  International Transaction Log, the system which record 
“transactions” of CERs from the CDM Registry to the national 
registries of Annex I Parties in accordance with the Kyoto Rules 
JI  Joint Implementation: Art. 6 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes that 
Annex I Parties (and firms in these countries) can transfer Emission 
Reduction Units from individual projects 
Kyoto Protocol  1997 Protocol under the UNFCCC to reduce GHG emissions 
globally. It entered into force on 16 February 2005 and will cover 
the period from 2008-2012; After 2012, a new framework or 
protocol will be needed. See “post-2012 framework” 
LULUCF  Land use, land-use change and forestry activities that influence 
GHG emissions. 
Marrakech Accords  Various decisions covering the implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol, signed in Marrakech at COP 7. Contains the majority of 
international provisions on the CDM. 
Methodology  Defines the baseline of a project activity or how emissions from this 
project will be monitored. Once approved (first by the DOE and 
than by the EB, with help of its Methodology panel) a methodology 
can be used as well for similar projects. Approved methodologies 
are available at http://www.unfccc.int/cdm. 
MOP  Meeting of the Parties, comprising representatives of governments 
that are Party to the Kyoto Protocol. The MOP is the supreme 
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MtCO2e  Millions of tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, the most commonly 
used way to express quantities of GHGs 
NGO Non-Governmental  Organisation 
N2O  Nitrous oxide, one of the six GHGs covered by the Kyoto Protocol 
ODA  Official Development Aid 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Parties  Countries that are party to the UNFCCC. The European Community 
is also a Party 
Post-2012 framework  Describes the – yet to be established – global framework beyond 
2012 to reduce GHG emissions, when the Kyoto Protocol expires 
Sinks 
 
The ability of land to absorb CO2. Land-use changes that lead to 
sinks (such as afforestation, reforestation) or remove sinks (e.g. 
deforestation), are counted against a country’s emissions 
Sector-specific target  A GHG emissions reduction target for specific sectors (e.g. energy 
intensive industry) 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreed 
at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1992). The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilise 
GHG emissions at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. The most 
important climate agreement negotiated in the UNFCCC so far is 
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About the European Climate Platform 
ECP 
The ECP is a joint initiative of the Climate Policy Research Programme 
(Clipore) of the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research 
(Mistra) in Stockholm and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in 
Brussels. Established in 2005, the ECP aims to facilitate interaction within 
the policy research community, mainly but not exclusively in Europe. Its 
working methods consist of bringing together  a select number of policy-
makers, negotiators and experts to vigorously debate key topics in the area 
of international climate change policy and to widely disseminate its 
conclusions. The ECP actively seeks dialogue with policy-makers and other 
stakeholders while being dedicated to academic excellence, unqualified 
independence and policy relevance. The ECP is governed by a steering 
group, drawn from government and academia. For further information, see: 
http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=484. 
About the Climate Policy Research Programme 
CLIPORE 
Clipore is an international research programme that aims to stimulate policy-
oriented research that contributes to moving forward global efforts to combat 
climate change. A steady and integrated process of research and dialogue 
with stakeholders lies at the foundation of the Clipore programme: spawning, 
developing, sharing, scrutinizing and refining ideas. The programme is 
comprised of two large climate policy research projects, independent 
university positions and the Clipore Policy Forum.  For more information see: 
www.clipore.org 
About the Centre for European Policy Studies 
CEPS 
Situated in the nexus between academia, business and policy-making, 
CEPS performs a unique role as an independent analyst and critic of 
European policy. CEPS’ core expertise is the conduct of policy research on 
European affairs including climate change and the broad dissemination of its 
findings through a regular flow of publications and events. (See: 
www.ceps.be on CEPS in general and for a description of its energy, climate 
change and sustainable development programme: 
http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=12). 
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